States of emergency do not only imply a significant change in the balance of powers between the three branches of government, they are also very frequently declared: between 1985 and 2014, at 
Introduction
Nine out of ten countries have constitutionalized their emergency provisions (Bjørnskov and Voigt 2015) . And the power to declare a state of emergency has been used quite frequently indeed: between 1985 and 2014, 137 countries declared a state of emergency at least once. This implies that roughly 2/3 of all countries declared a state of emergency during that period. In this paper, we seek to identify the factors that make governments declare a state of emergency.
Declaring a state of emergency has far-reaching consequences for all citizensbasic rights are frequently suspended under emergencies. But declaring a state of emergency also has far-reaching consequences for the balance of powers within government: the power of both the legislature and the judiciary are usually curtailed to the advantage of the executive.
At least two reasons for declaring a state of emergency come to mind: the government identifies an "exceptional and imminent danger to the life of the nation" 3 which could be caused by natural disasters -but also by man-made dangers such as terrorist attacks. A charitable interpretation of why governments call states of emergency would therefore be that the additional emergency powers granted by the constitution are necessary to act with due diligence to save people and alleviate the social and economic consequences of emergencies. But a government might also declare a state of emergency because it is eager to use the additional powers connected to a state of emergency in its own favor; for example to weaken opposition. As such, states of emergency may be called for reasons not associated with actual emergencies, but as a tool to improve the chances of remaining in office. 3 Quote
from the Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogations Provisions in the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In section II.A39(a)(b) of the Principles, such a threat is defined as one that "affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of the territory of the State and threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political independence or the territorial integrity of the State or the basic functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure and project the rights recognized in the Covenant."
No previous study has analyzed the factors that lead governments to declare a state of emergency. We are, however, aware of two papers that have produced data on declared states of emergencies, namely Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) and Richards and Clay (2012) . But their authors are not interested in the reasons behind declaring a state of emergency but rather ask whether declaring a state of emergency makes a difference in the rights that are subsequently derogated. In a sense, they are interested in the effectiveness of international law as that provides the possibility to derogate from a number of basic rights under specified conditions. Hafner- Burton et al. (2011, 703) find that governments of stable democracies and with strong courts are most likely to derogate "to provide themselves breathing space to respond to domestic crises by suspending individual liberties without breaching their treaty obligations." Richards and Clay (2012) ask whether the legal prohibition to violate non-derogable rights during states of emergency works and answer that it does not.
We are here not interested in the effectiveness of international law, but rather in the factors that lead governments to declare a state of emergency at home.
Comparing cases in which governments did declare an emergency with those in which they did not but could have because the preconditions were given, we find that it is crucial to distinguish whether a state of emergency is declared as a consequence of a natural disaster or of political unrest. Relying on a sample of up to 116 countries, we find that states of emergency based on natural events are declared significantly more often when declaring them is possible without the explicit consent of other political actors such as the legislature or the judiciary; in other words: when declaration has low direct costs. Declarations referring to domestic turmoil are more likely when an economic crisis is hitting the country and political unrest (measured by the number of anti-government demonstrations, general strikes, politically motivated assassinations and the like) is high. We find that overall, democracies and autocracies behave remarkably similarly although declarations of states of emergency based on political events are more frequent among democracies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we discuss a number of potentially relevant factors for declaring a state of emergency. In Section 3, we describe the data on which our empirical estimates are built and offer some descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains a number of stylized facts as well as bivariate correlations between declarations of emergency and country characteristics. Section 5 provides the regression results and their interpretation. Section 6 concludes.
Theory
We assume all actors to be individual utility-maximizers. Here we only analyze the behavior of politicians who are in government and assume that their overarching goal is to remain in office, i.e. that they only strive for a positional good. This seems reasonable as remaining in office is usually the only way to keep on enjoying political rents. 4 We propose to distinguish two approaches to remaining in office: (1) to play by the rules and try to stay (or become) sufficiently popular to be re-elected or (2) to misuse the emergency laws to postpone the election, weaken the opposition or the like. 5
At base, the switch from not having declared an emergency to declaring one implies that some parameters must have changed. These might be exogenous events, such as natural disasters, but also upcoming events, such as national elections. Before these events, it must have been utility-maximizing not to declare a state of emergency. After their occurrence, this must have changed, implying that all possible alternative options were attributed lower net-utility by those declaring the state of emergency. We propose to discuss a number of potential benefits resulting from the declaration of a state of emergency and turn to possible cost components in turn.
Use of any measure that increases the probability of staying in office is considered a benefit here. We assume that politicians in office prefer to have more 4 Note that our assumption regarding the goals of government does not restrict the analysis to democracies as autocratic governments also act under the threat of losing office. 5
Then chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder was able to turn an almost certain defeat into a win at the national elections on September 22 nd in 2002. The flood of the river Elbe had allowed him to position himself as a strong leader. This is an example of the former approach. But ceteris might never be paribus. It is well known that parties are systematically stronger under parliamentary than under presidential systems (see, e.g., Shugart 1998). On average, parties can be expected to have a longer time horizon than individual politicians. If that is the case and the (relevant) median party member expects democracy to perpetuate in the foreseeable future, then this is likely to increase the costs of declaring an emergency considerably, one reason that the credibility problem every government needs to deal with will be more severe after an emergency. We hence hypothesize (1b) that countries with strong parties have a lower likelihood of declaring emergencies, ceteris paribus. Now, hypotheses 1a and 1b are in conflict with each other. Which of the two prevails will only be revealed by an empirical test.
The power differential will not only be determined by a simple comparison of the executive's competences in normal times with those in emergency times. Many 6 Notice that this is not universally true as refraining from certain competences is often the only way for politicians to make their promises credible.
governments have the option to choose extraordinary policy measures that are below the threshold of an emergency. If these can also be used to keep the current government in office, they should be taken into account as explicitly as possible.
Measures that come to mind include but are not limited to the use of executive decrees, the use of non-civil courts to have civil cases dealt with in front of them etc. The more such options are available, and the easier it is to rely on them, the lower the power-differential and the lower, hence, the likelihood to observe a state of emergency being declared. These alternatives need, hence, to be taken into account explicitly when calculating the power-differential. Previous research (Bjørnskov and Voigt 2015) shows that countries with a high degree in the separation of powers in normal times allocate substantial powers to the executive under emergencies. The question here is whether this power differential is, indeed, activated by declaring emergencies.
Declaring a state of emergency also entails costs. The higher these are, the lower the likelihood to declare an emergency. We propose to distinguish between two cost categories, namely direct and indirect ones. The direct costs of declaring an emergency are the costs of organizing the majorities that need to consent to it whereas indirect costs refer to the loss of popularity that government suffers as a consequence of declaring a state of emergency among members of the legislature, the judiciary and citizens at large.
The higher the number of veto players and the more heterogeneous their preferences, the more difficult it will be to declare a state of emergency and the higher, hence, the direct costs. One factor determining the willingness of legislators to consent to their own -if temporary -disempowerment is the degree of competences they forego under an emergency. But we do not need to include this negative power-differential as it can be thought of as the flipside of the (positive) power-differential just described with regard to the executive.
Hypothesis 2: The more difficult it is to secure consent to declaring an emergency, the lower the probability of its declaration.
Direct costs are unlikely to cover all costs that accrue to government by declaring an emergency. Since states of emergency usually entail a substantial shift in the balance of powers in favor of the executive and to the detriment of both the legislature and the judiciary, these branches are likely to give government a more difficult time after a declaration. Since states of emergency usually also entail a containment of some basic rights, they might be unpopular among the population at large. A very general hypothesis 3 hence reads: The higher the indirect costs of declaring an emergency, the less likely its declaration.
This hypothesis is only testable after "indirect costs" have been broken down into their most important components and after they have been made measurable. We argue that indirect costs are determined by at least six factors namely exogeneity of the event, regime type, relative strength of the judiciary, relative strength of the military, overall strength of institutions, and international commitments and suggest ways to measure these as we go along.
Causes for calling an emergency can be more or less exogenous. In general, natural disasters are more exogenous than man-made disasters. These, in turn, tend to be more exogenous than domestic political causes. We hypothesize that the higher the (perceived) degree of exogeneity of the event that is used to justify the declaration of a state of emergency, the lower the indirect costs (as well as the direct ones). Time and again, scholars of emergency regimes have evaluated ex post judicial review as a rather toothless instrument to constrain government (see, e.g., Ackerman 2004 or Dyzenhaus 2006 .
A more general take on the shift of powers towards the executive -and away from both the legislature and the judiciary -is to enquire into the general strength of the judiciary. The higher the actual degree of independenc that the judiciary enjoys, the higher the likelihood that it will give government a hard time under a state of emergency. This is, hence, another type of indirect cost.
In many countries, actors beyond the three branches of government narrowly conceived have substantial influence on government decisions. No government the world over can afford to alienate the military. Assuming that representatives of the military have a strong preference for "law and order", we conjecture (hypothesis 3d) that the stronger the military, the higher the likelihood of calling a state of emergency, c.p.
According to Acemoglu et al. (2013) , there can be settings under which voters have an interest to dismantle checks and balances. Their model assumes that there are two groups in society, namely the rich and the poor and there are more poor than rich people. If checks and balances function well, the executive's discretion is low and its overall income too. This enables the rich who are assumed to have solved their collective action problem to bribe government into policies furthering the interests of the rich. In such circumstances, the poor might prefer fewer checks and balances; although the overall income of the executive will increase, bribing it will be more difficult implying that policies are closer to the preferences of the poor. Acemoglu et al. (2013, 859) point out that this result is likely in "weakly institutionalized states" that are described as states in which "the rich lobby can successfully bribe politicians or influence policies using non-electoral means."
Assuming that the separation of powers is higher in normal times than in times of emergency, it follows that the poor may prefer a state of emergency over a "normal" state of affairs. There would, hence, be some "demand" for a state of emergency and the corresponding indirect costs for government would be low. Now, Acemoglu et al. are careful in pointing out that this is only true in "weakly institutionalized states." This corresponding hypothesis thus reads (hypo 3e): C.p., more emergency declarations will be observed in weakly institutionalized states. We propose to test this argument empirically by relying on perceived corruption levels as proxy for the weakness of institutions. This approach is based on institutions as equilibria. As soon as some institutions -such as those making up checks and balances -are not in equilibrium any more, there will be forces to establish a different one. In this particular case, the new equilibrium entails fewer checks and balances than the previous one. Interpreted like this, emergency constitutions can be seen as low-cost devices to switch equilibria.
In addition to indirect costs caused domestically, there might also be an international source for them: if a country has ratified the ICCPR and its government has pledged not to derogate on a number of basic rights, then the emergency also needs to be declared to the international community. This might entail political as well as economic costs that might, in turn, make government less popular at home. We hence propose to control for ratification of the ICCPR.
The corresponding hypothesis 3f reads: Countries that ratified the ICCPR are less likely to declare a state of emergency, c.p.
There are a number of choices that are very expensive when made for the first time. These high initial costs function as a kind of threshold that keeps many people from ever making such a choice. But once the particular choice has been made, subsequent choices become less costly and the threshold vanishes. This refers to some kind of habituation and might also be true with regard to declaring emergencies. 8 Loveman (1993, 26) Until now, the "events" were implicitly assumed to be natural disasters or manmade extreme situations such as civil wars or violent strikes. But up-coming elections might also serve as a trigger to call a state of emergency, the more so, the less popular the current government is. We hence hypothesize (5) that the probability of calling a state of emergency increases the closer a scheduled election date is. This hypothesis needs, however, some qualification: declarations will be more likely, the less popular the government currently is.
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In their influential paper on the effects of coups d'état, Londregan and Poole (1990) talk of a "coup trap".
Once a country has experienced a coup, it is more difficult avoiding future ones.
Testing this hypothesis will be no mean feat. Election dates are not equally exogenous to start with: in parliamentary systems new elections often become necessary after a government has not survived a vote of no confidence. In many countries, elections are times of increased domestic violence -and calling an emergency on these grounds might well be justified. One way to control for the latter could be to control for ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the assumption that most of the said violence was caused by high degrees of fractionalization.
In a previous paper (Bjørnskov and Voigt 2015) , we dealt with the determinants of both the introduction of emergency provisions into constitutions and the degree of powers transferred to the executive in case a state of emergency is declared. It will be interesting to see whether some of the determinants driving the introduction of emergency provisions into constitutions also determine the likelihood of actually making use of the provisions. We find that governments having reached office via a coup are a lot more likely to introduce emergency provisions into the constitution and that the powers conferred to the executive are more pronounced. Both the inclusion of emergency provisions into the constitution and the powers transferred to the executive can be interpreted as a threat that should the country develop in a way disliked by the military, it will be ready to call an emergency and use the respective powers. If the threat is credible, then governments having come to power as a consequence of a military coup
should not be more likely to call states of emergency. We will test whether this is, indeed, the case.
Note that the implicit assumption is that governments strive to remain within the bounderies defined by the constitution. Alternatively, government might, of course, decide not to comply with the constitution at all. In a sense, we assume that intra-constitutional means are always less costly than extra-constitutional ones. The question whether this is actually the case can only be answered if we have data on the degree to which governments comply with their emergency provisions under a state of emergency. Since such data is not readily available, the answer cannot be given here.
This concludes our theory section and we now move on to present a number of stylized facts on the number of emergency declarations and some correlations.
Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
This section first describes the data used for the empirical analysis and then moves on to present some descriptive statistics. We begin with the description of our dependent variable, i.e. the calling of a SOE.
The dependent variable
To identify the factors that determine whether a government calls a state of emergency or not, we need a sample that includes cases in which government could have declared a SOE but decided not to. The dataset by Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) Regarding domestic turmoil, we first draw on the weighted conflict index as provided by Banks (2004) which takes into account assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and antigovernment demonstrations. In addition, we ask whether there was a coup or a coup attempt in a given year which would have justified declaring a SOE (Rode and Bjørnskov 2016). In the following, we code a country as being able to declare a state of emergency, if any emergency is reported for a given country year in the 9 Since counting all disasters regardless of how small they were would give us a rather inclusive list, we effectively require that the disaster is of a size such that it affects at least one in every thousand citizens in the country, or about 1000 people in the average country. We note that our resutls pertaining to natural disasters in the following are quite robust to changing this threshold.
EM-DAT or the country receives a positive score by Banks or if there was a coup or coup attempt.
In the following, we rely on an updated version of the dataset that allows us to estimate events up to 2010. Since various hypotheses posit that the reasons for calling a state of emergency subsequent to a natural disaster might significantly differ from those subsequent to domestic political turmoil, we separate these two classes of potentially triggering events from each other and estimate their determinants separately. We also take care of the potential influence of repeat or perpeatual SOEs by providing a set of estimates in which we exclude observations in which an SOE was also in effect in the previous year.
Independent variables
Our theory section focuses on both costs and benefits of declaring a SOE. In a previous paper (Bjørnskov and Voigt 2015) , we have developed an Index of Emergency Powers (INEP) that contains three benefit as well as three cost components. The latter reflect how costly it is for government to call a SOE and takes into consideration who has the power to declare a SOE (it is costly if the legislature or other bodies need to consent or have the power to declare it altogether), who has the power to approve a SOE (it is costly if the government needs the approval of other actors to declare a state of emergency) and the number of conditions named in the constitution as legitimate basis for declaring a SOE (the fewer conditions are named as justification for declaring a state of emergency, the more difficult it is to declare). The benefit components take into consideration whether after having declared a SOE, government has the power to dissolve parliament, to suspend some basic rights, and the right to expropriate its citizens and censor the media. We have coded the INEP for 411 constitutions covering 159 countries. It is coded between 0 and 1 where 1 indicates complete powers to the executive. A high coding of the cost component thus indicates low costs for the executive whereas a high coding of the benefit components indicates a high level of benefits accruing to the executive.
We propose to distinguish between the constitutional number of veto players and their actual number. As long as the constitution remains unchanged, the constitutional number of veto players will remain unchanged. However, the actual number of veto players is subject to change over time. It depends on whether, e.g., the majorities of the two houses in a bicameral system originate with the same party -or different ones. For data regarding the actual number of veto players, we rely on the most recent version of the POLCONIII dataset by Henisz (2010) .
The first hypothesis does not deal with the absolute powers a government enjoys after having declared a SOE -i.e. the benefits tout court -but with the degree to which it enjoys powers beyond and above those it enjoys anyways. Fish and
Kroenig (2009) broad conditions allow parliament to do so; 3) whether ministers must be members of parliament; 4) whether the legislature has the power to investigate the executive; 5) whether it can initiate an election; 6) whether it can nominate ministers; 7) whether it needs to approve ministers; 8) whether it is wholy or partially responsible for the interpretation of the constitution; 9) whether members of parliament have immunity from prosecution; 10) whether the legislature is elected by citizens; 11) whether it can propose amendments to the constitution; 12) whether it can declare war; 13) whether it can sign treaties with foreign pwers; 14) whether it has the power to dismiss judges; and 15) whether the constitution places limits on the eligibility to serve in parliament. All elements are coded on a 0-1 scale with constitutional uncertainty coded .5 and larger powers or lower limits coded with increasing scores. The total index is therefore scaled from 0-1.
We include the IPLI as the extra benefits an SOE conveys on the executive are not only determined by the (relative) power of parliament but also by the power of the judiciary. While it would be ideal to have a measure for the competences the judiciary enjoys in reviewing legislation -and decrees -that have been passed while the SOE lasted, such an indicator is unfortunately not available. We hence propose to use the de facto degree of judicial independence as a proxy for the (relative) power of the judiciary; data are from Linzer and Staton (2015) . We also add a measure of international legal obligations by capturing whether the country has ratified the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Data on ICCPR ratifiers come from the U.N. Treaty Collection and we use the year in which the respective country ratified the ICCPR. 10 On the one hand, we expect the indirect costs of declaring a SOE to be higher in democracies. On the other, autocrats might enjoy more powers to start with so they might have fewer incentives to declare a SOE. Our source for form of government is Cheibub et al. (2009) . The nice thing about their data is that they do not only separate between democracies and autocracies but group democracies into parliamentary, mixed, and presidential and autocracies into civilian, military and royal.
With respect to the factors that may trigger an SOE, we first include the weighted conflict index as provided by Banks (2004) For the natural events, we employ information on how many people are affected by either natural or man-made environmental disasters. The main ideas is that the more people are affected by a natural disaster, the higher is the probability of a 10 In additional tests not reported in the following, we also included a proxy for the strength to which states are institutionalized. This variable, which is a composite of the corruption and bureaucratic quality variables from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) turned out never to be close to significance and limited the sample size.
SOE being called on that rationale. We rely on the variable "Disaster affected" from the EM-DAT already mentioned above.
Controls
Legal origin; Almost all countries that adopted an emergency constitution before 1850 belong to the French civil law tradition (Bjørnskov and Voigt 2015) . Friedrich (1968, 561f.) argues that treatment of emergencies depends on legal families. According to him, the consequences of calling a state of emergency are heavily influenced by whether a country belongs to the (French) civil law tradition or the common law world. Since we cannot exclude that the likelihood of calling an emergency are also influenced by legal families, we control for them.
Population size; ceteris paribus, larger countries are more likely to be hit by a natural disaster and could, hence, also be more likely to declare a state of emergency. To control for this possibility, we include the (log) of population size.
Per capita income; higher income is likely to be correlated with safer housing and a more resilient infrastructure. Natural disasters could have fewer effects on richer countries which might therefore experience fewer states of emergency.
Negative growth; Governments'popularity is, to a large extent, determined by how fast the economy grows. Periods of negative growth are likely to make government highly unpopular. In such periods, governments could be more willing to declare a state of emergency, simply to secure its survival in office.
After cold war; this is a dummy variable that is to account for the possibility that governments were more (or less) likely to declare a state of emergency before the end of the cold war. We refrained from including more fine grained time variables to safe degrees of freedom.
Postcommunist; a dummy variable indicating whether a country used to be communist. Inclusion of this variable allows us to disentangle the time effect (captured with the cold war variable) from the effect of having been communist.
Descriptive Statistics
To get an impression regarding the development of emergencies that have been called since 1980, Figure 1 simply Figure 2 illustrates the probability of a state calling an emergency given that there is an event that justifies the action. As such, the figure is based on
Haffner-Burton's (2011) coding of 1835 events of which 945 resulted in an officially declared state of emergency. 1458 of them are classified as nationalpolitical events while 234 are natural disasters; the small remainder consists primarily of extraterritorial events such as wars and cross-border civil unrest.
Resting on our alternative identification of events, we observe 705 situations in which an SOE was called (out of a total of 2546) and where some political event allowed the call, and 701 situations in which an SOE was called and where a natural disaster was present (out of a total of 3858).
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
However, the data behind the figure also illustrate that the share of all potential states of emergency resulting from national-political events that were actually called decreased average, 87% of all natural disasters that could constitutionally cause a state of emergency were called. This is in line with hypothesis 3a which states that calling a SOE as a consequence of more exogenous events is connected with lower indirect costs and, hence, more likely.
Our data, which we summarize in Table 1 , also show that democracies tend to be more likely to call states of emergencies: in democracies, 69% of all events resulted in a state of emergency while the corresponding likelihood for autocracies was only 43%. While democracies called a state of emergency in 92% of all natural disasters and 62% in all national-political events that qualified calling a state of emergency, the corresponding likelihods in autocracies were 73% and 43% respectively. We observe substantial differences across political institutions. Countries without constitutionalized emergency provisions are substantially more likely to call states of emergency whenever there is one: in the small number of cases without consitutional emergency provisions, 73% of all potential states of emergencies were called.
Stylized Facts and Bivariate Correlations
In this section, we simply present a number of bivariate correlations. Since there is no previous research on the determinants of declaring states of emergency, the figures below will hopefully help the reader to develop a sense of potentially interesting associations. Figures 2 and 3 depict the unconditional probability of observing an SOE in equally sized groups below (striped columns) and above (black columns) of any of the eith variables, given that there is a potential reason for calling an SOE based on either a natural disaster (Figure 2 ) or a political event (Figure 3 ).
Insert Figure 2 about here Insert Figure 3 about here
In both cases, the figures illustrate that larger events -disasters affecting a larger part of the population in Figure 2 and larger conflicts in Figure 3 -are associated with a higher probability of calling an SOE: in both cases, the probability in the half with larger events is significantly higher than in the half of the sample with smaller events. Similarly, the simple comparison indicates that more SOEs in situations with natural disasters are called in democratic, richer, more populous countries with stronger legislatures, more independent judiciaries and emergency constitutions that yield more power to the executive.
Likewise, in cases with larger social conflicts, SOEs called for national-political reasons appear more likely in more populous countries with stronger emergency constitutions. However, the simple illustration does not exhibit any significant differences between democracies and autocracies, rich and poor countries, or more or less independent or strong judiciaries and legislatures. As such, a first look at the data clearly indicates that the determinants of calling SOEs are likely to differ substantially between the two main types of emergencies.
Regression Results and their Interpretation

Main effects
In Table 3 , we report the results of estimating our baseline specification. We estimate the determinants employing logit with regional fixed effect (Asia, Latin
America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa) and legal origins fixed effects (common, civil and Islamic law). We report results of using the full sample in columns 1 and 2, where we restrict the sample in columns 1, 3 and 5 to countries in which at least one in a thousand was affected in a given year by a natural disaster. In columns 2, 4 and 6, we restrict the sampe to countries in which there was a coup or conflict in a given year. In columns 3 and 4, we exclude all Western countries while we in columns 5 and 6 exclude all country observations in which the country also registered an SOE. While we are aware that we are therefore likely to throw out a number of SOEs called in close sequence, the purpose is to focus on only new SOEs and not those either spanning more than one year or becoming permanent, as in Israel and Egypt. Requiring that all control variables are available reduces our sample to a maximum of 975 observations from 113 countries for the potential natural disasters and 847 observations from 111 countries for the national-political disasters.
Insert Table 2 about here
We first note that across the table, more populous countries are more likely to call SOEs under comparable conditions. While we also find what appears to be evidence of rich countries calling more natural SOEs, the results in column 5 where we exclude all repeat or permanent SOEs shows that the apparent result is driven by the permanent emergencies. The same appears to be the case for social conflict, which thus seems to be associated with prolonged SOEs, but not their onset. Similarly, we find no evidence that natural disasters affecting a larger share of the population are more likely to lead to an official SOE than smaller disasters.
GDP, whether the level or crises and recessions in which GDP growth turns negative, also turns out insignificant.
Focusing on the political determinants, we find no robust evidence of any direct effects of either judicial independence, the strength of the legislature, or whether countries have ratified the ICCPR. However, we find clear evidence that military coups (failed as well as successful) are associated with substantially higher probabilities of calling an SOE. We also find that the cost elements of the INEP, i.e. how easy it is for the executive to call and SOE, strongly affects how likely it is that an SOE is actually called when a natural disaster is evolving.
Regarding the specific form of government, we first note that the omitted variable is parliamentary democracy (monarchies are missing simply because we do not have an absolutist monarchy in our sample). Comparing regime types, we find that presidential democracies are more likely than either parliamentary democracies or autocracies to call an SOE. We also observe some evidence that even democracies with a weak president are more likely to call SOEs even though this finding is only robust for national-political SOEs.
Both civil and military autocracies are more likely to call a SOE on the basis of political turmoil than parliamentary democracies. This is completely in line with our expectations. Within the three types of democracies, presidential systems seem significantly more likely to declare a natural disaster based SOE than parliamentary ones. Although this result is not robust to the exclusion of Western countries, it contradicts our expectations as governments of presidential systems are likely to experience fewer power gains than those of parliamentary systems.
Interestingly, governments of mixed democracies are more likely to declare political unrest based SOEs than parliamentary ones.
Finally, neither of the two dummies (after cold war, postcommunist constitution) turns out to be a significant determinant. An analysis of the legal origin fixed effect conversely reveals that common, French civil law as well as Islamic law systems are all more likely to declare a political SOE than the benchmark German / Scandinavian civil law system.
Conditional effects
The main estimates in Table 2 nevertheless assume that all effects are homogenous. In Tables 3 and 4 , we relax this assumption by allowing the effects of the size of the events -the number of affected by a natural disaster and the size of the conflict index, coups and economic crises -to vary with political characteristics. Specifically, we estimate whether the sensitivity of governments to the size of events varies with five political factors that affect their objective ability to react by calling an SOE.
Insert Table 3 about here   Insert Table 4 about here For natural disasters, we find a single important effect: The higher the IPLI is, i.e.
the stronger powers are allocated to the legislature, the more likely is it that a larger natural disaster causes the government to call an SOE. We essentially find that with legislatures that are virtually lame ducks, the government is not sensitive to the size of the disaster. Conversely, in countries with strong parliaments, larger natural disasters are substantially more likely to cause the government to call an SOE.
Focusing instead on the national-political SOEs, we first find that governments are much more likely to ract to general social conflict by calling when the emergency constitution makes it substantially more difficult to call an SOE. Quit conversely, we find that governments are more likely to react to military coupswhich in the case of successful coups means the new government -are more likely to call an SOE the more benefits the emergency constitution provide them with. Finally, in the same situation, we note that military coups only tend to cause government to call an SOE when the judiciary is not independent and when government does not face substantial other veto players.
As such, the more detailed estimates in which we allow effects to be heterogeneous provide three eminently intuitive results: stronger legislatures are more likely to call an SOE when they face larger natural disasters and governments tend to react to military coups be calling an SOE when they face no or very limited veto players and control the judiciary, and when the emergency constitution provides them with more influence during the emergency. However, the estimates also show the puzzling result that when facing a social conflict, governments in countries in which the emergency constitution makes it more difficult to call an SOE, are more likely to do so when facing more conflict. Yet, before considering how to interpret this particular result, we briefly explore the robustness of our main findings
Robustness checks
We test the robustness in several different ways. We have first changed the cutoffs at which we define a potential SOE. In Tables 2-4 , we apply a cut-off for natural disasters of events that affect at least one in every thousand inhabitants of the country. In separate tests, we have experimented with either lowering it to any inhabitants (1128 observations) or increasing it five-fold (824 observations), yet we in general find similar effects effects. With national-political events, we have similarly increased the cut-off but find similar effects with two exception: while successful military coups lose significance, higher cut-offs yield military regimes significantly associated with more SOEs. As such, most results in the above appear robust to intuitive tests changing the sample. Likewise, we have added several additional variables capturing the geographical size of the country, military size, a dummy for federal states, colonial origins, a measure of the de facto quality of judicial and bureaucratic institutions from the International Country Risk Guide, constitutional monarchies, and decadal fixed effects. None of these variables turned out to be significant and none affected the main findings.
With this set of robustness tests supporting the main results, we therefore proceed to discussing how to interpret them.
Conclusions and Outlook
In this paper, we have been interested in the factors that enable us to predict under which conditions a state of emergency will be called -and under which conditions it will not be called. Relying on a dataset comprising more than 2000 events that might have triggered the declaration of a state of emergency and systematically separating SOEs potentially justified with natural disasters from SOEs justified with domestic turmoil, we find that it is, indeed, crucial to distinguish between natural and political disasters as the reasons for calling a SOE systematically diverge between the two events.
Quite generally, we find that the less costly it is for governments to declare an SOE for political reasons, the more likely they are to do so. However, higher benefits as a consequence of calling a SOE are only significantly associated with a higher likelihood of calling an SOE in the context of coups and coup attempts. Overall, democratic governments are more likely to call an emergency than autocratic ones. Yet, this difference is driven by specific types of democracy: Within the group of democracies, parliamentary governments are substantially less likely to rely on emergency measures than both presidential and mixed governments. We also find evidence that in some contexts, having strong veto institutions, legislatures with particular powers and independent judiciaries can effectively block SOEs.
There are nevertheless a number of potentially important questions that we have not been able to deal with here. From a political economy point of view, we suspect that some emergencies are declared primarily to strengthen the position of the current executive -and not to enhance the survival of the nation. If the executive is motivated by such concerns, some natural disasters might be a very welcome pretext for being able to call a SOE. Untangling cases in which government was interested in the best reply to a natural disaster from those in which the natural disaster simply served as a welcome pretext is, however, no mean feat.
There is, however, quite some anectodatal evidence that this does occur frequently: The hurricane that swept over the Dominican Republic in 1931 is considered by some to be the initiation of the Trujillo dictatorship. The 1954 hurricane over the same island was used by the would-be dictator of Haiti to firmly establish himself and so on (these -and more -examples can be found in Drury and Olson 1998) . The possibility of misuse as well as the actual misuse of emergency constitutions should definitely be analyzed in future work.
A natural follow-up paper will deal with the question whether emergency constitutions are effective. Do they help governments to reach the goals they are purported to reach? Or do they simply imply a shift in the balance of powers toward the executive and less civil and political rights for the citizens at large?
Emergency constitutions grant governments special powers in a number of explicitly specified situations. They, hence, constitute a possibility for government to enhance its own powers legally, if only for a limited period of time. But declaring a state of emergency that is in conformity with the constitution is only way for government to enhance its own papers. Alternatively, it could refrain from calling an SOE and simply overstep its own competences. This leads directly to two follow-up questions: (1) under what conditions do governments prefer to enhance their powers within the constraints of the constitution -and under which conditions do they simply renege upon the constitution? It seems straightforward to assume that the costliness of legally declaring an SOE could be one decisive factor. (2) After having declared an SOE, governments face another choice: should they abide by the emergency constitution or not? After having declared an SOE, they might feel that the powers granted under it are still not sufficient or they might simply enjoy the situation so much that they prolong it time and again.
This paper has dealt with the determinants of calling a state of emergency. It almost suggests itself to also inquire into the determinants of terminating a state of emergency. In trying to answer this question, it might also make sense to look at the personal characterists of those at the helm. 
